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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah State Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated. 
§78-2-2(3)(i), 1953 as amended, and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The nature of the proceedings below involve 
a damages suit against the State of Utah and Staker Paving and 
Construction Company as a result of their failure to breach or 
cause to be breached several coffer dams after extending the 
respective culverts under 1-15 in association with the diking of 
1-15. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does §63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, provide the State of Utah total and complete immunity in 
relation to the construction and management of flood control 
systems nullifying the express waivers as provided in the 
remainder of the governmental immunity act. That is, more 
specifically, do §§ 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, act as express waivers of immunity 
for §63-30-3? 
2. Do the acts of Defendant State of Utah which 
damaged Christensen & Griffith Construction Company constitute 
management of flood waters and other natural disasters or the 
construction, repair and operation of the flood and storm 
systems? 
3. Does the 1984 amendment to §63-30-3, U.C.A., 
retroactively apply to damages incurred by Christensen and 
Griffith pursuant to an already existing contract? 
4. Does immunity granted by the 1984 
amendment to §63-30-3 U.C.A. violate due process provisions 
of the U.S. and Utah constitutions? 
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5. Does immunity exist after the State has notice of 
continued flooding caused by the State's actions and the State 
fails, refuses or is negligent in not taking corrective action? 
6. Was summary judgment properly granted in light of 
the following questions of material fact: 
a. The waters of Utah Lake did not cause the damage to 
the Plaintiffs. The waters backed up on the east side of 1-15 by 
the Defendants' failure to remove the coffer dams damaged the 
Plaintiff. 
b. An estimate of the level of Utah Lake for the 
summer of 1984 at 4495 feet above sea level was made in the plans 
and specifications used in the bid process for the golf course. 
The high-water level peak was expected about Memorial Day, 1984f 
and was expected to continue for two and one-half weeks. The 
high water on the east side of 1-15 continued past the two and 
one-half weeks and remained until the coffer dams were breached 
in mid-Septemberf 1984. 
c. Christensen & Griffith planned its construction 
to work on areas of higher elevation until the water receded 
at the expected time in mid-June. When the water did not recede, 
Christensen & Griffith was effected in several ways. These 
effects included a slowing of the work because of working in 
water, the need to use drag lines instead of backhoes and 
scrapers, and the need to move material twice (once to remove it 
from flooded areas and again to place it where it was intended). 
d. The artificially high water on the east side of 
1-15 was caused by the failure of the defendants to remove the 
coffer dams. 
e. Defendant State of Utah had notice of the problem 
and failed to take corrective action. 
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Ill, DETERMINITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATUTES 
Utah Const. Art I §18 
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or 
law impairing the obligation of contracts 
shall be passed." 
33 U.S.C.A. §702c (See addendum). 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3, 1953, as amended: 
Immunity of Governmental Entities from Suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, 
and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public 
or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental function and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
their employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8, 1953, as amended: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or 
other structure located thereon. (Emphasis 
added). 
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Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9, 1953, as amended: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused from 
a dangerous or defective condition of any 
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, 
or other public improvement. Immunity is not 
waived for latent defective conditions. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10, 1953, as amended: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment...(exceptions to this waiver of 
immunity are for circumstances not applicable 
to the current situation). 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff, Christensen & Griffith Construction Company, 
appeal from summary judgment in favor of Defendant State of Utah, 
based upon an absolute grant of immunity from §63-30-3, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended. The plaintiff's complaint alleges negligence 
against Defendants State of Utah and Staker Paving and 
Construction Company in connection with work along 1-15 South of 
Provo. The negligence entailed failure to remove coffer dams 
used in construction resulting in an unnatural use and prolonged 
high water level on the east side of 1-15 where Christensen and 
Griffith was performing contract work for Provo City. 
V. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
1. Plaintiffs filed the complaint on May 13, 1985. 
2. Defendant State of Utah filed an Answer and 
Crossclaim against Defendant Staker Paving and Construction 
Company on June 13, 1985. 
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3. Defendant Staker Paving and Construction Company 
filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint on June 24, 1985 and an 
Answer to State of Utah's Crossclaim and filed a Counterclaim to 
the Crossclaim. 
4. Defendant, State of Utahf filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on September 21, 1987 based upon governmental 
immunity. 
5. Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construction 
Company filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment on November 2, 1987. 
6. The Defendant, State of Utah, filed a Reply 
Memorandum to Provo City on October 27, 1987 and an additional 
Reply Memorandum to Christensen & Griffith on November 18, 1987. 
7. The Fourth Judicial District Court set forth a 
Memorandum Decision dated December 2, 1987 and entered its order 
granting Defendant State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
January 15, 1988, from which this appeal is taken. 
8. The District Court issued an Order pursuant to Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on February 8, 1988. 
9. Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith filed their Notice 
of Appeal on March 4, 1988. 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construction 
Company contracted with Provo City to construct the East Bay Golf 
Course. The Notice of Award was signed February 22, 1984 (Kemp 
deposition Exhibit #13). The construction contract Agreement was 
signed on March 5, 1984 (Kemp Deposition Exhibit #12). The 
contract required completion of the project within 105 calendar 
days. The Notice to proceed was signed on March 12, 1984 (Kemp 
Deposition Exhibit #2, Kemp Deposition page 67, 68, and 70). 
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2. The project plans and specifications were prepared 
by the Neff Alliance, an architectural and engineering group 
responsible for the golf course design and construction. 
Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith prepared their bid based upon 
the information provided in the plans and specifications. 
3. The estimated high-water level for Utah Lake during 
the summer of 1984 was 4,495 feet above sea level. The high-
water level peak was expected about Memorial Day, 1984, and was 
expected to continue for two and one-half weeks (Kemp Deposition 
pages 47, 48, 51, 52 and 67). 
4. The plans and specifications were based upon 
historic data, being Memorial Day, that Utah Lake has reached its 
peak (Kemp Deposition page 52, 66 and 69). 
5. Further, the flood year of 1983 provided the Neff 
Alliance with the worst case scenario, whereby the Neff Alliance 
projected that the flood water elevation would reach 4,495 foot 
level during the summer of 1984, as it did in 1983, and remain at 
that level for two and one-half weeks (Kemp Deposition page 44, 
50, 51). 
6. Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith planned its 
construction work so that work on the higher elevation areas 
would be completed until the water would recede at the expected 
time in mid-June. Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith anticipated 
working under some water, but they also anticipated and planned 
to work on the dry lands before and after the high-peak periods 
(Gary Griffith Affidavit, Kemp Deposition pages 67, 68). 
7. Utah Lake reached its peak level on approximately 
June 10, 1984. The high-peak elevation was one-inch higher than 
4,495 feet above sea level (Kemp Deposition page 91). 
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8. The Utah Lake water elevation (west of 1-15) 
controls the water elevation on the east side of 1-15. 
Historically, the water on the east side of 1-15 is approximately 
1/10 of a foot higher than the Utah Lake elevation (Kemp 
Deposition pages 65, 110). 
9. The high-water level on the east side of 1-15 also 
reached its high level point on or about June 10, 1984. However, 
the water on the east side of 1-15 remained at that level past 
the two and one-half weeks as projected, and remained at that 
level until mid-September, 1984, when the coffer dams were 
breached by Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith (David Griffith 
Deposition pages 5, 16-19, 28-32; Gary Griffith Deposition pages 
18-20; Kemp Deposition pages 107, 110, 142, 171, 172; Gary 
Griffith Affidavit). 
10. The water level on the east side of 1-15 stayed 
one to one and one-half feet higher than the Utah Lake water 
level until mid-September, 1984 (Kemp Deposition page 95, 96, 
107, 171; Kemp Deposition Exhibit #3 entitled "Graph of Water 
Levels of 1984"). 
11. Approximately the same time that the golf course 
project began construction, the State of Utah began construction 
on what they called "The Utah Lake Dike Project." The Dike 
Project consisted of placing a dike on both sides of 1-15, from a 
point just south of the Ironton Connection to north of the 
University Avenue overpass (Keyes Deposition pages 4, 5). 
12. There are several waterways located in the area of 
the dike project which carry water from the mountains on the east 
side of 1-15 to the west side into Utah Lake. Since 1-15 runs 
north and south between the mountains and Utah Lake, it acts as a 
dam keeping water from flowing in its natural drainage course. 
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When 1-15 was constructed, several water-carrying culverts were 
created underneath 1-15 to allow the water to flow its natural 
drainage course from the mountains east of 1-15 to the west side 
into Utah Lake. The drainage through the culverts from the east 
side of 1-15 to Utah Lake on the west side, is the cause of the 
historical one-tenth (1/10) of one foot difference in elevation 
between the Utah Lake and the water level on the east side of 
1-15 (Kemp Deposition pages 20-26, 108-110)« 
13. Part of the dike project consisted of extending 
some of those culverts through the dikes which were placed on 
both sides of 1-15 so that the water could continue to flow 
through the culverts to Utah Lake (Keyes Deposition pages 6, 8 
and 10). 
14. The process of extending the culverts and pipes 
involved building a dam, referred to as a coffer dam, around each 
end of the culvert or pipe. The water trapped between the two 
coffer dams would then be pumped out to create a dry area for 
making the extensions on either end of the culverts. With the 
coffer dams in place, the flow of water through the culvert was 
impeded (Keyes Deposition pages 11, 12, 25). 
15. The construction on the dike project began in late 
March to early April, 1984 (Keyes Deposition pages 11, 12, 25; 
Kemp Deposition pages 163, 164). 
16. A dramatic increase in the water elevation on the 
east side of 1-15 was immediately noticed once the coffer dams 
were put into place. This situation was communicated to an 
inspector for the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) by Mr. 
Earl Kemp of Forsgren & Perkins. Mr. Kemp was assured by UDOT 
that this situation was only a temporary situation and that they 
were trying to complete the diking project prior to the spring 
runoff (Kemp Deposition pages 163, 164, 189). 
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17. UDOT conducted its final inspection on or about 
July 3, 1984f and Defendant Staker Paving and Construction 
Company was released from the project. Defendant Staker Paving 
and Construction Company was not seen on the diking project site 
after that time (Kemp Deposition page 160). 
18. Mr. Kemp communicated for at least four months 
with the UDOT concerning the flooding and water situation 
involved on the golf course project. He contacted Mr. J.R. 
Wilson, Mr. Skip Anderson, and several design engineers at the 
UDOT main office. These individuals denied that the diking 
project caused the flooding on the golf course project and 
refused to take any actions (Kemp Deposition pages 158, 159, 163, 
164, 166, 167). 
19. On or about September 12, 1984, David Griffith, an 
employee of Christensen & Griffith, inspected the coffer dams on 
the west side of 1-15 and found that the Utah Lake water level 
had receded far enough below the coffer dams to see that the 
coffer dams were keeping the water from flowing into Utah Lake. 
The coffer dam created a waterfall trickling over the top of the 
coffer dam. Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith communicated this 
situation to UDOT, whereupon they obtained permission to breach 
the coffer dams. When Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith breached 
the coffer dams, water gushed through and out into Utah Lake 
(Gary Griffith Deposition pages 28-32; Kemp Deposition pages 174, 
175, 186). 
20. Once the coffer dams were breached, the water 
elevation on the east side of 1-15 dropped one and one-half feet 
within a 72 hour period. After the breach of the coffer dams, 
the golf course project proceeded without flood problems. (Kemp 
Deposition pages 171, 172, 175). 
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21. When the water did not recede on the east side of 
1-15 as expected/ Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith was effected 
in several ways. The effects included a slowing of the work 
because of working in water, the need to use draglines instead of 
backhoes and scrapers and the need to move material twice (Gary 
Griffith Affidavit; Kemp Deposition pages 67, 68, 107, 167, 168). 
22. The failure to remove the coffer dams caused the 
high water and the resulting damage to Plaintiff Christensen & 
Griffith (Kemp Deposition page 107). 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I; The 1984 legislative amendment to §63-30-3, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, specifically enumerates 
governmental functions which are subject to the specific 
exceptions in the remainder of the chapter. Therefore, under the 
Standiford test, management of flood waters and other natural 
disaster, etc., meets the threshold question of being a 
governmental function, but, under the second step of the 
analysis, governmental immunity is specifically waived by 
§§63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10, in the case at hand. 
POINT II: The acts of Defendants damaging Christensen 
and Griffith do not constitute management of flood waters and 
other natural disasters, etc., as provided in the 1984 amendment. 
Rather it was Defendants1 negligent failure to breach the coffer 
dams once the dike project was finished that created a man-made 
flood by which Chrisensen and Griffith were damaged. 
POINT III; Christensen and Griffith Contruction 
Company had enterd into a private contract with Provo City, prior 
to the enactment of the 1984 amendment. Therefore, the Utah 
State Legislature is prohibited from altering or effecting valid 
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contracts by Art. I, Sec. 18, of the Utah Const. The amendment 
cannot be applied to this project. 
POINT IV; An interpretation of the 1984 amendment 
granting governmental entities total immunity simply by asserting 
their acts were flood related constitutes an unconstitutional 
taking without due process. 
POINT V; Material issues of fact remain which preclude 
the State from being granted their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT 
GRANT THE STATE OF UTAH IMMUNITY FOR THE ACTS 
WHICH HAVE CAUSED PLAINTIFFS DAMAGE. THE 
ACTS OF THE DEFENDANTS ARE SPECIFICALLY 
EXEMPTED FROM GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
Interpreting the Governmental Immunity Act, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d, 
1230 (Utah 1980), abandoned the "governmental v. propietary 
function" test which was previously used in deciding whether a 
governmental entity was immune from suit and adopted a two-part 
analysis. The first step in the analysis is to determine whether 
the government's activity that caused the injury was a 
governmental function of such unique nature that it could only be 
performed by a governmental agency or that it was essential to 
the core of the governmental activity. The second step of the 
analysis, if the activity is held to be a governmental function, 
is to determine whether the immunity for the governmental 
function has been specifically exempted under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
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Following Standiford, in Johnson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp,, 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981) the court further refused to 
grant governmental entitites immunity, when it explained that the 
first part of the Standiford tests, "does not refer to what 
government may do, but to what government alone must do." The 
court has continued its reluctance to grant governmental entities 
immunity for injuries caused by their acts, and has held under 
the Standiford test, that the operation of public golf courses, 
Standiford supra; winter recreation areas on a public golf 
course, Johnson; supra; the supervision of disbursement of 
escrowed funds, Cox v. Utah Mortgage and Loan Company, 716 P.2d 
783 (Utah 1986); and the operation of a sewage system, Thomas v. 
Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982), Dalton v. Salt Lake 
Subdivision Sanitary Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984), are not 
governmental functions within the governmental immunity act. 
Based on the two part analysis at Standiford, if the 
acts of the defendant satisfy the threshold question as being a 
governmental function, the court must inquire as to whether the 
government's immunity has been expressly waived. The 1984 
legislative amendment to §63-30-3 was a specific enumeration by 
the legislature of acts they deemed as "governmental functions" 
under the governmental immunity act. Furthermore, the 
legislature placed the amendment after the preface in §63-30-3, 
which subjects governmental functions to specific exceptions as 
further provided in the chapter. Thus, the management or 
construction, repair and operation of flood storm systems are 
governmental functions that are subject to the specific 
exemptions provided within the chapter and is not a total grant 
of immunity. 
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The complete language of §63-30-3f Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, is as follows: 
Immunity of Governmental Entities from Suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, 
and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public 
or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental function and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
their employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. (Emphasis added) 
In the case at hand, at least three specific exceptions to the 
grant of governmental immunity apply. These exceptions include 
§§ 63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. 
Section 63-30-8 states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or 
other structure located thereon. (Emphasis 
added). 
Section 63-30-9 states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused from 
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a dangerous or defective condition of any 
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, 
or other public improvement. Immunity is not 
waived for latent defective conditions. 
(Emphasis added). 
Section 63-30-10 states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment...(exceptions to this waiver of 
immunity are for circumstances not applicable 
to the current situation). (Emphasis added) 
The Utah State Supreme Court has had numerous occasions 
to interpret §§63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 63-30-10, in light of 
flooding conditions negligently caused by governmental entities, 
and has held that these specific exceptions waive the 
governmental immunity. In Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 
P.2d 741 (Utah 1971), the Utah State Supreme Court held that the 
University of Utah was not immune from suit for damages caused by 
flooding to an adjoining land owner as a result of the 
University's construction project. In constructing the Merrill 
Engineering Building and the adjacent parking lot, the University 
of Utah altered the natural drainage flow from a northerly 
direction to a westerly direction. As a result, the plaintiff's 
home was flooded in 1963, for which she was compensated. After 
reassurance by the University of Utah that the situation that 
created the flood conditions of 1963 had been remedied, in 1967, 
during a rain storm, plaintiff's basement was once again flooded 
by water and mud. 
The Court affirmed the lower court's decision in 
adopting a rule of "reasonable use" which entitles the possessor 
of land to be "legally privileged to make a reasonable use 
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of his land,..." Id. at 743. "Any invasion of a person's 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land as a result 
of an adjoining land owner's diversion of the flow of surface 
water is actionable as private nuisance." Id. at 744-745. In 
examining the Governmental Immunity Actf the court held that §§7 
and 10 reveal that the legislature "waived immunity in regard to 
a particular type of tortious conduct by a particular class of 
peoplef namely negligent acts or omissions by employees while in 
the scope of employment." The court further held that §§8 and 9 
reveal that the legislature waived immunity "in regard to certain 
interests invaded or harmed or damages inflicted without 
reference to the type of conduct which caused the invasion." Id. 
at 745. The court went on to state that the waiver of immunity 
in §§8 and 9 "encompasses a much broader field of tort liability 
than merely negligent conduct of employees within the scope of 
their employment," and that §10 should not be interpreted to 
modify §§8 and 9 even though "negligent conduct of an employee 
might be involved in an action for injuries caused by the 
creation or maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition." 
Id. at 745. 
Thusf the Court in Sanfordy supra, held that §§63-30-8, 
63-30-9 and 63-30-10f all waived the governmental immunity of the 
University of Utah for their negligent acts which caused the 
plaintiff's flooding of her adjoining property. 
Consistent with Sanford, supraf the Court in Reader v. 
Brigham City, 413 P.2d 300 (Utah 1966), held that a landowner has 
the right to be free from receiving waters on his lands to his 
damage which do not find their way in their natural course and 
under natural conditions. 
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The Court has also held that §63-30-9 specifically 
waives governmental immunity for damages as a result of flooding 
to land owners due to the acts of a governmental entity. In 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), the Court held that 
damages sustained by a homeowner's property from flood waters 
resulting from the negligent construction of a highway project 
came within the provisions of §63-30-9. The court states: 
The State by its design and specifications 
for the highway which was being constructed 
under the supervision under the highway 
department resulted in diverting the water 
from former channels which had previously 
carried it to points beyond the plaintiff's 
properties. This conduct comes within the 
provisions of §63-30-9, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended,•••• 
Id. at 1120. 
Furthermore, Layton City was not immune from the 
damages it caused by negligently abandoning a sewer drain during 
the rainy season which resulted in water collecting in the sewer 
drain and saturating the plaintiff's property causing the 
plaintiff's house and yard to sink. Parrish v. Layton City 
Corporation, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). Again, in 1978, Salt 
Lake County was not immune from damages to plaintiff's garage 
caused by the county's leaky storm drain. Vincent v. Salt Lake 
County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978). In both instances, the 
governmental immunity was specifically waived by §63-30-9. 
In addition to the court's explanation of §63-30-10 in 
Sanford, supra, wherein the court held that §63-30-10 is not a 
limit on §§8 and 9, the court provided for recovery for damages 
as a result of negligent acts or omissions of a governmental 
employee. This was again echoed in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 
627 (Utah 1983), where the court stated: 
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Section 63-30-10 waives immunity for injuries 
caused by the negligent act or omission of a 
government employees (except those arising 
out of "a discretionary function")• 
Furthermore/ the Utah State Supreme Court has held that 
governmental immunity is waived for negligent acts of the 
governmental entities. In Bigelow v. Ingersolly 618 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1980)f in a case where the plaintiff sued the State of Utah 
for negligently designing a traffic control light at the 
intersection where the plaintiff was involved in a collision/ the 
court held that the state was liable for the damages as a result 
of the collision. The court stated: 
Although the acts of the state involved in 
designing the traffic control system involves 
some degree of discretion/ as do almost all 
acts/ the design of the traffic control 
system does not involve the "basic policy 
making level." 
This conclusion follows earlier cases dealing 
with similar subject matter. This court in 
Andrus v. State, (cite omitted)/ held that 
the preparation of plans and specifications 
and the supervision of the manner in which 
the building of a highway was carried out 
were non-discretionary functions. In Carrol 
v. State Road Commission/ (citation omitted)/ 
the court held that a road maintenance 
supervisor's decision to use berms as the 
best means of protection was not a basic 
policy determination and was not within the 
discretionary function exception of 
§63-30-10(1). 
In light of the foregoing/ we find the 
defense of §63-30-10(1) was inappropriately 
applied to this cause of action. 
Id. at 53-54. 
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Thus, the court held that the state's negligent design 
of the traffic control light resulted in the damages to the 
plaintiff and that governmental immunity was specifically waived 
under §63-30-10. Again, in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
(Utah 1985), the court held that §63-30-8 expressly waived the 
governmental immunity for the city of Woodland Hills in an action 
where plaintiff alleged that Woodland Hills was negligent in 
allowing trees, shrubs, and other growth to obscure vision at the 
intersection and negligently failed to maintain a stop sign. 
In light of the foregoing analysis of the Standiford 
test and this Court's limitations on immunity for damages 
negligently caused by a governmental entity, the 1984 legislative 
amendment cannot be construed to grant total immunity to 
governmental entities and remain consistent with the remainder of 
the act and this court's interpretations and application of the 
specific waivers. 
Finally, the trial court's reliance on the 8th and 9th 
Circuits' interpretation of the Federal Immunity Statute in 
granting the State total immunity from damages incurred as a 
result of water buildup behind the coffer dams, was unfounded. 
Section 33 U.S.C.A. §702c "does not confer wholesale immunization 
on the United States from all liability for flood water damage," 
Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971). In Stover 
v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 477 (D. N.D. Cal., N.D. 1962), in 
a case that involved the plaintiff's lands being inundated with 
flood waters as a result of breaks of various levies, the court 
stated: 
I do not interpret §702c as granting a 
blanket immunity to the government in all 
cases involving the destruction of, or damage 
to, property by every conceivable type of 
flood or flood water. (See Atkinson v. 
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Marrott, Chapman and Scott). In situations 
where the negligence of the government is the 
sole proximate and actual cause of the taking 
of the property, §702c is not a defense upon 
which the government can rely....It (702c)is 
not however, intended to extend to 
inundations, of an artificial nature, solely 
caused by the instrumentalities of man. 
Id. at 484. 
The court went on to state that, "Title 33 U.S.C.A. 
§702c does not apply to 'man-made floods1 which results solely 
from negligent acts." It further defines man-made floods as "a 
flood which is created solely by the construction or fabrication 
of a barrier which impounds a substantial quantity of water 
which, but for the barrier, would not have been impounded•" Id. 
at 485. 
The trial court's reliance upon the 8th and 9th 
Circuits' interpretation of the Federal Immunity Statute was 
erroneous in light of the facts of this case, the creation of a 
man-made flood and the negligence of the State of Utah. The 
Federal Governmental Immunity Act does not grant total immunity 
and would not grant immunity in the case at hand. 
POINT II 
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANTS CAUSING THE DAMAGE 
TO CHRISTENSEN & GRIFFITH CONSTRUCTION DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS AND 
OTHER NATURAL DISASTERS, OR THE CONSTRUCTION, 
REPAIR AND OPERATION OF FLOOD AND STORM 
SYSTEMS WHICH ARE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. 
The amendment to Utah Code Annotated §63-30-3 which 
Defendant, State of Utah, relies upon for governmental immunity 
establishes that the management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
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and storm systems are governmental functions. However, the acts 
which caused the injury to Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith do 
not qualify. The facts of this case show that the damages to 
Christensen & Griffith Construction Company were not the flood 
waters of Utah Lake, but in fact were man-made floods as a result 
of the failure to breach the coffer dams once the construction of 
the dike was finished. The facts show that the level of Utah 
Lake had fallen to the level where the involved land east of 1-15 
would not have been under water had the coffer dams been breached 
prior to the conclusion of the construction of the dikes. 
Assuming arguendo, that the statute grants the State of 
Utah total immunity for the construction and management of flood 
waters and other natural disasters, the Defendant's actions would 
not qualify under the terms of the statute. The statute would 
exempt the State from liability in cases involving natural floods 
or flood waters, but would not grant immunity for damages as a 
result of man-made floods. In the case at hand, the natural 
flood and flod waters had reached its maximum level and had begun 
to recede. The Millrace and Slate Canyon waterways had reached 
their maximum runoff level as projected by Forsgren & Perkins, 
but the water level east of 1-15 remained at the high level due 
to the unnatural structure prohibiting the flow of the water from 
the east side of 1-15, west into Utah Lake. 
The construction of the dike project by the State of 
Utah was completed in July, 1984, but the damage to Christensen & 
Griffith continued beyond the construction period and until 
September, 1984 when Christensen & Griffith breached the coffer 
dams. Notice had been given to the State concerning the 
continuing problems of flooding facing the golf course project, 
but the State took no action. This failure to act is negligence 
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of an employee for which the Governmental Immunity Act does not 
insulate the State from liability. Under the facts existing in 
this case, the State's position that management of flood waters 
or construction of a flood system were involved cannot be 
supported. 
POINT III 
CHRISTENSEN & GRIFFITH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
HAD ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT WITH PROVO CITY 
BEFORE THE 1984 AMENDMENT WENT INTO EFFECT. 
THE STATE IS PROHIBITED FROM ALTERING OR 
EFFECTING VALID CONTRACTS. 
Plaintiff Christensen and Griffith Construction Company 
entered into a valid and binding contract on March 5, 1984f and 
began work immediately thereafter. By contrast, the effective 
date of the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Annotated §63-30-3 was 
March 29, 1984. Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construction 
Company was already obligated to construct and build the golf 
course project within 105 days when the amendment was enacted. 
Article 1 §18 of the Utah State Constitution provides, in 
pertinent part, "no law impairing the obligation of contracts 
shall be passed." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a statute or 
amendment should not be applied in a retroactive manner to 
deprive a party of his rights, vested rights, interest, create a 
new obligation, impose a new duty, or impose greater liability 
upon the parties to the contract. See Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission and State of Utah, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985); Pilcher 
v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983); 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial Commission, 268 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1954). 
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In Marshall^ supra, and Silver King Coalition Mines 
Company, supra, the court held that the statute providing for 
workman's compensation benefits at the time of the accident were 
the applicable statutes, rather than those statutes enacted after 
the initial benefits began• Thusf the subsequent statutes 
limiting the amounts recoverable by the plaintiff were 
ineffective because the statutes could not be applied 
retroactively. Also, in Burnham v. Bankers Life and Casualty 
Company, 470 P.2d 261 (Utah 1970), the court held that the 
legislative enactment in 1963 granting an additional period of 
contestability of a life insurance policy upon reinstatement, was 
not applicable to an action on a life insurance policy originally 
issued in 1962. 
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
constitutionality of statutes that impair the vested rights or 
impose greater liability upon the parties to the contract is 
consistent with the majority of jurisdictions. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that, "a law which postpones or accelerates a 
period of performance of contract, or imposes conditions not 
expressed therein, or dispenses with performance of essential 
provisions therein, however immaterial, impairs its obligation." 
Klorman v. Westcliff Company, 170 A. 251, 252 (N.J. 1934). The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Mortgage Deficiency 
Judgment Act that compelled a mortgagee to accept the appraised 
value on its realty in place of money as part of the liquidation 
of the mortgagor's obligation on the bond was held to be, "an 
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation." Beaver 
County Building & Loan Association v. Winowich, 187 A. 481, 490 
(Penn. 1936). For similar holdings in additional jurisdiction, 
see also: Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1965); Ward v. 
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Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 598 P.2d 1027 (Ariz. App. 1979); Phillips 
v. City of West Palm Beach, 70 S.2d 345 (Fla. 1954); Georgia 
Franchise Practices Commission v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 262 
S.E.2d 106 (Ga. 1979); Guest v. Stone, 56 S.E.2d 247 (Ga. 1949). 
Prior to the 1984 amendment to §63-30-3, Christensen 
and Griffith entered into a binding contract with Provo City to 
construct the East Bay Golf Course. Christensen and Griffith was 
obligated to perform according to the contract. To grant the 
state total immunity under the 1984 amendment, would 
retroactively impose new and greater obligations, liability and 
duties upon Christensen and Griffith than they had contracted. 
Christensen and Griffith's contract was a private contract with 
Provo City, and thus, the State of Utah is prohibited from 
altering such contract. 
POINT IV 
INTERPRETING THE AMENDMENT TO GRANT ABSOLUTE 
AND UNQUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY WOULD 
RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL HAZARDS OF TAKING 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. 
An interpretion of the amendment that provides absolute 
immunity to governmental entities merely by asserting their acts 
as being "management of flood waters and other natural disasters 
for the construction repair and operation of the flood storm 
systems" poses constitional problems under the taking and due 
process clauses. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), 
wherein the government's negligence in losing plaintiff's 
property is an actionable violation of federal due process 
clause, unless state remedies are available; and Pair Development 
Company, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 240 S.E.2d 897, 899 (Ga. App. 
1977), wherein the city was held liable for taking by way of 
damage to a building while repairing the sewer line. 
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The Utah Governmental Immunity Act as it has been 
interpreted by the Utah State Supreme Court is constitutional/ 
(see Madsen v. Borthick, supra), but unqualified absolute 
immunity by the mere assertion of flood control management/ is 
unconstitutional/ particularly when there is no justification or 
rational basis for such an interpretation, 
POINT V 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST WHICH PRECLUDE 
THE STATE'S ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In a case dispositive of the one at hand/ the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an action against the city for damages 
and injunctive relief due to flooding of a landowner's property 
presented substantial issues of fact which precluded summary 
judgment. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 
1975). In another governmental immunity casef the Court in 
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987)f held that the 
factual issues resulting from a pedestrian's fall through a 
manhole presented genuine issues of material facts which 
precluded summary judgment for the city on grounds of 
governmental immunity applying §§63-30-8, 9 and 10. Moreover/ a 
Mississippi District Court/ in a case interpreting §702cf held 
that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment 
for the government/ where the determination remained as to 
whether the destroyed crops were a result of flood control or by 
construction for some other purpose. Clay v. United Statesy 647 
F.Supp. 110 (S.D. Miss. 1986). 
The statement of facts as set forth above and the 
factual questions discussed in Points Ir II and IIIf present 
numerous questions of fact which preclude the State's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment. If the finder of fact were to conclude that 
the acts of Defendant State of Utah (a) caused the damage to 
Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith; (b) did not constitute a flood 
related governmental function but rather a man-made flood; and/or 
(c) were exempted from governmental immunity, the State of Utahfs 
assertion of governmental immunity would have no basis. 
Moreover, the high-water level was expected to peak 
about Memorial Day, 1984, and was expected to remain at that 
level for two and one-half weeks. However, Christensen and 
Griffith assert, and the State of Utah denies, that the water on 
the east side of 1-15 remained one to one and one-half feet 
higher than the Utah Lake water level until mid-September, when 
Christensen and Griffith breached the coffer dams. The cause of 
the articially high water on the east side of 1-15 was the 
failure of the Defendants to remove the coffer dams. As a 
result, Christensen and Griffith was affected in several ways, 
including a slowing of the work because of working in water, the 
need to suse draglines instead of backhoes and scrapers, and the 
need to move material twice. 
Because material issues of fact still remain that would 
prohibit the State of Utah from asserting governmental immunity, 
the trial court erred in granting the State of Utah summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erred in granting the State of Utah's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Total immunity has not been granted 
to the State under §63-30-3, U.C.A., 1953 as amended. Specific 
exceptions to immunity under §§63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 63-30-10, 
U.C.A., 1953, apply. Material issues of fact remain as to 
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whether the Statefs acts involve a governmental function and 
whether the State was negligent. 
The 1984 amendment to §63-30-3, U.C.A., 1953 does not 
apply to this situation because it became effective after 
Chrisensen and Griffith contracted to construct the golf course* 
Application of the amendment violates the Utah Constitution* 
Therefore, the precise relief sought by Plaintiff 
Christensen and Griffith is that Summary Judgment in favor of the 
State of Utah be reversed and the case be remanded to the 
District Court. ^ , 
OH 
DATED this / '— day of May, 1988. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellant Christensen 
and Griffith Construction Company 
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ADDENDUM 
Ch. 15 FLOOD CONTROL 33 § 702c 
Appropriations for projects relating to tributary streams, see section 702j of this title. 
Effect of Flood Control Act of June 22, 1936, on provisions for Mississippi River and other 
projects, see section 70 le of this title. 
Further modifications of project, see sections 702a-l'/t and 7022-1% of this title. 
Interest of members of Congress in contracts under this section for acquisition of land, see 
section 702m of this title. 
Levee rights-of-way, sec section 702n of this title. 
Liability from damage for flood waters under this section, see section 702c of this title. 
Morganza and Eudora FJoodways, see section 702a-11 of this title. 
Prosecution of project by Mississippi River Commission see section 702h of this title. 
Repeal of laws inconsistent with this section, see section 702/ of this title. 
Library References 
Levees and Flood Control «=»20. 
CJ.S. Levees and Flood Control § 10. 
§ 7 0 2 c , Expenditures for construction work; conditions prece-
dent; liability for damage from flood waters; condemna-
tion proceedings; floodage rights 
Except when authorized by the Secretary of the Army upon the recom-
mendation of the Chief of Engineers, no money appropriated under authori-
ty of sections 702a and 702g of this title shall be expended on the 
construction of any item of the project until the States or levee districts have 
given assurances satisfactory to the Secretary of the Army that they will (a) 
maintain all flood-control works after their completion, except controlling 
and regulating spillway structures, including special relief levees; mainte-
nance includes normally such matters as cutting grass, removal of weeds, 
local drainage, and minor repairs of main river levees; (b) agree to accept 
land turned over to them under the provisions of section 702d of this title; 
(c) provide without cost to the United States, all rights of way for levee 
foundations and levees on the main stem of the Mississippi River between 
Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and the Head of Passes. 
No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for 
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, 
however. That if in carrying out the purposes of sections 702a, 702b to 7Q2d* 
702e to 702g, 702h, 702i, 702j, 702k, 702/, 702nvand 704 of this title it shaH 
_be found that upon any-stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it is 
impracticable to construct levees, either because such construction is not 
economically justified or because such construction would unreasonably 
restrict the flood channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are 
"subjected to overflow and damage which are not now overflowed or 
damaged by reason of the construction of levees on the opposite banks of 
the river it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of 
Engineers to institute proceedings on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment to acquire either the absolute ownership of the lands so subjected,,to 
overflow and damage or floodage nghts over such lands. 
(May 15, 1928, c. 569, § 3, 45 Stat. 535.) 
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